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HOW MUCH IS COMMON SENSE WORTH?  
WHAT YOU PAID IS WHAT IT’S WORTH, EXCEPT 
WHEN IT COMES TO DEBT-EQUITY SWAPS 
 
 
ELISABETH S. SHELLAN* 
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This Note discusses how the gain resulting from a foreign debt-
equity swap should be valued for tax purposes. Usually, gain equals 
the amount realized from the transaction minus the basis in the 
property disposed of in the transaction (taxable gain = amount realized 
– basis).1 This seems very simple. For example, what is the gain from 
an exchange of pesos worth $19 million for dollar-denominated debt 
worth $11 million? Easy? Yes; $19 - $11 = $8 million. 
But what if the pesos you received in the exchange came with 
restrictions? You could only use the pesos in Mexico; to buy land in 
Mexico; to build a factory in Mexico, using only Mexican labor and 
supplies; and your factory had to export goods from Mexico. Maybe 
you would no longer think your pesos were worth $19 million? And 
maybe you no longer believe that your taxable gain from the exchange 
should be $8 million? So what are your pesos worth? 
You think your pesos are worth $11 million—that is after all, what 
you traded them for! But the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) thinks 
                                                 
* J.D. candidate, May 2007, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology; B.A. Economics, June 2001, Northwestern University. 
1 26 U.S.C. § 1001 (2000). 
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your pesos are worth $19 million (the face value of the bills is, after 
all, $19 million), and determines that you have $8 million in taxable 
gain! So how should your restricted pesos be valued? That is the 
question this Note will attempt to answer. 
This Note will first explain how gain is typically calculated and 
will then describe an alternative method of calculating gain. Then, it 
will summarize and critique Kohler Co. v. United States,2 the Seventh 
Circuit’s decision discussing how gain from debt-equity swaps should 
be calculated. Finally, this Note will conclude that United States v. 
Davis3 supplies a superior method for easily and correctly valuing the 
gain from debt-equity swaps. 
 
I. BACKGROUND  
 
 A. Mexico’s Debt-Equity Swap Program 
 
Mexico4 developed a debt-equity swap program during the 
1980’s,5 while the country was in the depths of an economic crisis6 
                                                 
2 Kohler Co. v. United States (“Kohler IV”), 468 F.3d 1032 (7th Cir. 2006), 
reh’g denied and reh’g en banc denied, No. 05-4472, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 3929 
(7th Cir. Feb. 12, 2007). 
3 United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962). 
4 Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, the Philippines, and Venezuela had similar 
programs as well. Leslie A. Sowle, Comment, International Debt for Equity Swaps: 
Does Revenue Ruling 87-124 Make Sense?, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 1079, 1079 n.1 
(1989); Ridgeley A. Scott, Taxation of Maquiladora Exchanges: The Taming of the 
Shrew, 5 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 201, 203 (1997) (citing Bruce Cohen, Tax 
Implications of Debt-for-Equity Swaps, 12 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 575, 
576 (1989); Thomas Reiter, The Feasibility of Debt-Equity Swaps in Russia, 15 
MICH. J. INT’L L. 909, 943-50 (1994); see generally Jon H. Sylvester, Impractibility, 
Mutual Mistake and Related Contractual Bases for Equitably Adjusting the External 
Debt of Sub-Saharan Africa, 13 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 258 (1992)). New programs, 
for example, in the Philippines, may emerge in the future. ASEAN asks int'l creditors 
to consider debt swap scheme, 
http://business.inquirer.net/money/breakingnews/view_article.php?article_id=43254 
(last visited April 29, 2007); Debt-for-equity swap plan gets big boost, 
http://www.manilatimes.net/national/2007/jan/14/yehey/metro/20070114met3.html 
(last visited April 29, 2007). 
2
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and could no longer service its foreign debt.7 The goal of Mexico’s 
swap program was to reduce the outstanding balance of the Mexican 
government’s foreign-currency-denominated debt while encouraging 
foreign investment in Mexico.8 Under the program, non-Mexican 
corporations that wanted to invest in Mexico, and therefore needed 
pesos, were able to purchase defaulted Mexican debt on the open 
market and then swap it with the Mexican government for pesos that 
could be spent only in Mexico.9 Mexico designed its program to 
ensure that 1) its debt would be canceled without requiring it to use 
foreign currency; 2) the non-Mexican corporation’s payment (made in 
exchange for the debt cancellation) would remain in Mexico; and 3) 
foreign currency would enter Mexico through the export of goods 
manufactured by the Mexican subsidiary of the non-Mexico 
corporation.10 
For United States tax purposes, the sale of Mexico’s debt for the 
restricted pesos is treated as a taxable sale.11 
 
                                                                                                                   
5 Kohler Co. v. United States (“Kohler I”), 247 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1085 (E.D. 
Wis. 2003). 
6 Id. 
7 Leslie A. Sowle, Comment, International Debt for Equity Swaps: Does 
Revenue Ruling 87-124 Make Sense?, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 1079, 1079 (1989). 
8 Kohler I, 247 F. Supp. 2d at 1085; see generally Christopher Gottscho, Note, 
Debt-Equity Swap Financing of Third World Investments—Will the I.R.S. Hinder 
U.S. Swappers?, 8 VA. TAX REV. 143, 153 (1988) (“Viewed optimistically, debt-
equity swaps may ultimately provide [less developed countries] with a second 
chance to develop the productive capacity that the huge amounts of external debt 
incurred was intended to finance”). 
9 Kohler Co. v. United States (“Kohler IV”), 468 F.3d 1032, 1033 (7th Cir. 
2006), reh’g denied and reh’g en banc denied, No. 05-4472, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 
3929 (7th Cir. Feb. 12, 2007). 
10 Kohler I, 247 F. Supp. 2d at 1085. 
11 Kohler IV, 468 F.3d at 1035.  
3
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B. How Gain is Typically Calculated 
 
First, it is important to understand that there is a difference 
between gain and taxable gain. The word “gain” means “sources or 
advantage acquired or increased.”12 This dictionary definition of 
“gain” is not the same as the way the Internal Revenue Code13 
computes “gain.” 
In the Internal Revenue Code, the amount of gain from a sale or 
exchange is determined according to 26 U.S.C. § 1001.14 Gain is equal 
to, “the excess of the amount realized therefrom over the adjusted 
basis.”15 The “amount realized” from a sale or exchange is “the sum of 
any money received plus the fair market value of the property (other 
than money) received.”16 Generally speaking, a property’s “basis” is 
the cost of the property.17 
If you apply these definitions to the situation described in the 
introduction to this Note, your taxable gain from $19 million worth of 
pesos exchanged for debt costing $11 million, would be $8 million 
($19 million (amount realized) - $11 million (cost/basis)).18 
Recall that if you did not receive any money in a transaction, your 
“amount realized” is equal to the fair market value of the property 
                                                 
12 WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (Frederick C. Mish, ed. 
1987). 
13 “Internal Revenue Code” refers to Title 26 of the United States Code. 
14 26 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2000) (“Computation of gain or loss. The gain from the 
sale or other disposition of property shall be the excess of the amount realized 
therefrom over the adjusted basis provided in section 1011 for determining gain, and 
the loss shall be the excess of the adjusted basis provided in such section for 
determining loss over the amount realized). In general, the gain realized from the 
conversion of property into cash, or from the exchange of property for other property 
differing materially either in kind or in extent, is treated as income. 26 C.F.R. § 
1.1001-1(a) (2006). 
15 26 U.S.C. § 1001(a). Gain = amount realized - basis 
16 26 U.S.C. § 1001(b). 
17 26 U.S.C. § 1012. 
18 26 U.S.C. § 1001. 
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received in the transaction;19 and remember that you, the taxpayer, and 
the IRS disagree as to the value of the pesos. What is the taxable gain 
if the fair market value of the property received in the transaction is 
unknown? 
 
C. How to Determine Fair Market Value When There is No “Market?” 
 
Sometimes the fair market value of property, like the restricted 
pesos described above, is not easily determinable because there is 
“little or no” market for the property.20 The fair market value of the 
pesos, or any property, matters because it is one component of 
calculating taxable gain. 21 
The idea that the fair market value of property might be equal to 
the fair market value of the property that it was exchanged for, was 
first recognized by the courts in 1954, with the decision in 
Philadelphia Park Amusement Co. v. United States.22 The Court of 
Claims23 held that “the value of the two properties exchanged in an 
arms-length transaction are either equal in fact, or are presumed to be 
equal.”24 In the case, the Court of Claims needed to determine the 
taxpayer’s basis in an extension of a railway franchise (for 
construction, maintenance, and operation of a passenger railway), the 
fair market value of which was difficult to determine.25 The court held 
that the fair market value of the franchise could be presumed to be 
equal to the fair market value of the bridge for which the franchise had 
                                                 
19 26 U.S.C. § 1001(b). 
20 Christopher Gottscho, Note, Debt-Equity Swap Financing of Third World 
Investments—Will the I.R.S. Hinder U.S. Swappers?, 8 VA. TAX REV. 143, 172-73 
(1988). 
21 26 U.S.C. § 1001. 
22 126 F. Supp. 184 (Ct. Cl. 1954). 
23 The Court of Claims is now known as the United States Court of Federal 
Claims. For information on the history of the court visit: 
http://www.uscfc.uscourts.gov/USCFChistory.htm (last visited April 29, 2007).  
24 Philadelphia Park Amusement Co., 126 F. Supp. at 189. 
25 Id. at 184-90. 
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been exchanged for, if the bridge’s value was more readily 
ascertainable than the franchise’s value.26 
In 1962, the Philadelphia Park rule was accepted by the Supreme 
Court in United States v. Davis.27 The Davis cases28 involved the tax 
consequences of Mr. Davis’ transfer of stock to his former wife as part 
of a property settlement executed prior to the Davis’ divorce.29 
The Court looked at the income tax consequences of Mr. Davis’ 
transfer of stock to his wife in two steps.30 First, the Court decided 
whether the transaction was a taxable event.31 Then, the Court 
determined what gain resulted from the transaction.32 The Court 
determined that Mr. Davis’ transfer of stock was a taxable 
transaction;33 however, this result has since been superseded by 
statute.34 Returning to the second issue, the Court held that absent a 
readily ascertainable value, the value of Mrs. Davis’ martial rights had 
a value equal to the stock she had traded for those rights.35 The Court 
                                                 
26 Id. at 167, 190 (emphasis added). 
27 370 U.S. 65 (1962). 
28 United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962) together with, Davis v. United 
States, also on certiorari to the same Court. 
29 Davis, 370 U.S. at 66. Specifically, Mr. Davis agreed to transfer to his wife, 
1,000 shares of stock in exchange for the then Mrs. Davis’ acceptance of the stock 
“in full settlement and satisfaction of any and all claims and rights against [her] 




33 Id. at 71. 
34 Congress intended to overrule the result in Davis with the passage of the Tax 
Reform Act of 1984, P.L. 98-369. H.R. REP. 98-432 (1984). The provision was later 
codified as 26 U.S.C. § 1041, which states: “General rule. No gain or loss shall be 
recognized on a transfer of property from an individual to (or in trust for the benefit 
of)-- (1) a spouse, or (2) a former spouse, but only if the transfer is incident to the 
divorce.” 26 U.S.C. § 1041(a) (2000). 
35 Davis, 370 U.S. at 72 (“Absent a readily ascertainable value it is accepted 
practice where property is exchanged to hold, as did the Court of Claims in 
Philadelphia Park Amusement Co. v. United States that the values ‘of the two 
6
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disagreed with lower courts,36 which had found that there was no way 
to compute the fair market value of Mrs. Davis’ marital rights and that 
it was therefore impossible to determine the taxable gain realized by 
Mr. Davis.37 The Supreme Court reasoned that it must be assumed, as 
there was no evidence to the contrary, that the parties acted at arms-
length and that they judged their martial rights to be equal in value to 
the property for which their rights were exchanged.38 The Court 
concluded that once it had recognized that the transfer between 
husband and wife was a taxable event, it was “more consistent with 
the general purpose and scheme of the taxing statutes to make a rough 
approximation of the gain realized thereby than to ignore altogether its 
tax consequences.”39 
In summary, the Supreme Court held in Davis that absent a 
readily ascertainable value, the values of two properties exchanged in 
an arms-length transaction are equal or are presumed to be equal to 
each other.40 In the forty-five years since the Davis decision, neither 
the Supreme Court nor Congress has overruled or superseded this 
holding. 
   
                                                                                                                   
properties exchanged in an arms-length transaction are either equal in fact, or are 
presumed to be equal’”) (internal citations omitted). 
36 The Court of Claims, from which Davis had been appealed, United States v. 
Davis, 370 U.S. 65, 66 (1962), had followed the precedent of the Sixth Circuit, 
United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65, 68 (1962) (“The matter was considered settled 
until the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in reversing the Tax Court, ruled 
that, although such a transfer might be a taxable event, the gain realized thereby 
could not be determined because the impossibility of evaluating the fair market value 
of the wife’s martial rights. Comm’r v. Marsham, 279 F.2d 27 (1960)”). 
37 Davis, 370 U.S. at 72. 
38 Id. (The Court acknowledged, but was not persuaded, that, “there is much to 
be said of the argument that such an assumption is weakened by the emotion, tension 
and practical necessities involved in divorce negotiations and the property 
settlements arising therefrom”). 
39 Id. at 72-73. 
40 Id. at 72. 
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D. Different Approaches: Valuing Debt-Equity Swaps 
 
Since the beginning of Mexico’s debt-equity swap program in the 
early 1980’s,41 there have been few judicial decisions considering the 
valuation of the amount realized, and hence the taxable gain, 
stemming from debt-equity swaps with Mexico. This section will first 
discuss IRS Revenue Ruling 87-124, which covers debt-equity swaps 
with foreign governments.42 Then, this section will review the Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit’s decision in G.M. Trading Corp. v. 
Commissioner43 and the United States Tax Court’s decision in CMI 
International, Inc. v. Commissioner.44 The Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit’s decision in Kohler Co. v. United States45 will be 
discussed in Section II. As only three cases been decided, it is 
premature to say there is a trend in the decisions. However, the 
decisions of the Tax Court, Fifth Circuit, and Seventh Circuit have all 
been in favor of the taxpayer.46 
Revenue Ruling 87-124 (the “Ruling”) was promulgated by the 
IRS, in 1987, to govern debt-equity swaps with foreign governments.47 
The Ruling describes three situations, with Situations 2 and 3 being 
variations on Situation 1.48 Situation 1 describes a debt-equity swap 
similar to the program described in Section I.A. above. First, a U.S. 
corporation purchases debt obligations from a U.S. bank for $60; 
second, the bank delivers the debt obligation to the foreign country’s 
central bank; third, the central bank credits 900 LCs (local currency) to 
the U.S. corporation’s foreign subsidiary’s central bank account; and 
                                                 
41 Kohler Co. v. United States (“Kohler I”), 247 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1085 (E.D. 
Wis. 2003). 
42 Rev. Rul. 87-124. 
43 121 F.3d 977 (5th Cir. 1997). 
44 113 T.C. 1 (T.C. 1999). 
45 (“Kohler IV”), 468 F.3d 1032 (7th Cir. 2006), reh’g denied and reh’g en 
banc denied, No. 05-4472, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 3929 (7th Cir. Feb. 12, 2007). 
46 G.M. Trading Corp., 121 F.3d at 981; CMI Int’l, Inc., 113 T.C. at 5; Kohler 
IV, 468 F.3d at 1037. 
47 Rev. Rul. 87-124. 
48 Id. 
8
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fourth, the foreign subsidiary issues all its capital stock to its U.S. 
parent.49 The Ruling acknowledged that the restrictive character of the 
local currency received in the swap would “generally reduce” the fair 
market value of the currency below the value of currency “convertible 
at the free market exchange rate.”50 However, no further guidance for 
establishing the value of the restricted currency was provided.51 The 
Ruling concluded that the U.S. corporation has a gain on the exchange 
of the debt obligations for the local currency “to the extent the fair 
market value of the 900 LCs [local currency] exceeds $60 [the price 
paid for the debt obligation].”52 
Revenue rulings are not binding upon the courts.53 Since its 
publication, no court has chosen to apply this Ruling. When the Fifth 
Circuit examined debt-equity swaps, it described the Ruling as 
erroneous as a matter of law.54 And, when the Seventh Circuit 
addressed the issue, it did not even mention the Ruling in its opinion.55
 In 1994, the Tax Court ruled on the first debt-equity swap case,56 
which was later appealed to the Fifth Circuit in 1997.57 In G.M. 
Trading Corp. v. Commissioner, G.M. had surrendered $600,000 worth 
of Mexican national debt to the Mexican government in exchange for 
approximately 1.7 billion pesos, whose use was restricted to the 
construction of a G.M. plant in Mexico.58 The Fifth Circuit rejected 
                                                 
49 Id. (“Y purchased the Obligation from X for $60, which was the fair market 
value of similar FC debt in the secondary markets outside of FC. X, on behalf of Y, 
delivered the Obligation to the Central Bank, which credited an account of FX at the 




53 Broadview Lumber Co. v. United States, 561 F.2d 698, 704 (7th Cir. 1977). 
54 G.M. Trading Corp. v. Comm’r, 121 F.3d 977, 980 (5th Cir. 1997). 
55 Kohler Co. v. United States (“Kohler IV”), 468 F.3d 1032 (7th Cir. 2006), 
reh’g denied and reh’g en banc denied, No. 05-4472, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 3929 
(7th Cir. Feb. 12, 2007). 
56 G.M. Trading Corp. v. Comm’r, 103 T.C. 59 (T.C. 1994). 
57 G.M. Trading Corp. v. Comm’r, 121 F.3d 977 (5th Cir. 1997). 
58 121 F.3d at 978.  
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Revenue Ruling 87-124,59 because the court found that this Ruling 
implicitly held that no portion of a debt-equity swap would qualify as 
a nontaxable contribution to capital under 26 U.S.C. § 118.60 
The court found that there were two parts to the restricted peso 
payment G.M. had received.61 The first part of the peso payment by the 
Mexican government to G.M. was for extinguishing part of Mexico’s 
national debt.62 The second part of the payment was a contribution to 
capital because the payment was to persuade G.M. to invest in 
Mexico’s economy.63 The test for determining whether a particular 
payment is a contribution to capital under section 118 is “the intent or 
motive of [Mexico].”64 “[T]he contribution 1) must become a part of 
the recipient’s capital structure; 2) may not be compensation for a 
‘specific, quantifiable service’; 3) must be bargained for; 4) must 
result in a benefit to the recipient; and 5) ordinarily will contribute to 
the production of additional income.”65 
The court concluded that the solution to the valuation problem 
was to bifurcate the payment.66 G.M. would be taxed on the value of 
the restricted pesos received in exchange for extinguishing the debt.67 
                                                 
59 Rev. Rul. 87-124. 
60 G.M. Trading Corp., 121 F.3d. at 980. 
61 Id. at 981. Total = Payment to G.M. for extinguishing debt (Davis rule) + 
Contribution to G.M.’s capital (section 118). 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 980 (citing United States v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co., 
412 U.S. 401, 411 (1973)). 
65 G.M. Trading Corp., 121 F.3d 977, 980-81 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing Chicago, 
Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co., 412 U.S. at 413). 
66 G.M. Trading Corp., 121 F.3d at 980-81 (Bifurcation of a section 118 
contribution to capital is allowed, according to the Fifth Circuit, because “according 
to the plain terms of the statute, anything that qualifies as a contribution to capital is 
nontaxable . . . the statute mandates bifurcation by requiring that any, rather than 
some, contributions to capital be excluded from income”). 
67 Id. 
10
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The balance of the payment would be excluded from taxation as a 
contribution to capital under 26 U.S.C. § 118.68 
Returning to the first part of the payment (the taxable portion, not 
exempt under section 118), the court found that, “when property with a 
readily ascertainable value is exchanged for property without one, the 
latter property is presumed to be equal in value to the former.”69 The 
court emphasized that this principle reflects the common sense notion 
that an asset’s value is the price persons are willing to pay for it.70 The 
court concluded that since the transaction was at arms-length, and 
since there was not a readily ascertainable value for the amount and 
worth of the pesos exchanged for the debt extinguishment, the court 
had to follow Davis and assume that value received for $600,000 of 
debt was, in fact, $600,000.71 
The next court to tackle the debt-equity swap valuation issue was 
the United States Tax Court.72 In 1999, the United States Tax Court 
issued its decision in CMI International, Inc. v. Commissioner.73 In 
CMI, CMI-Texas (a wholly owned subsidiary of CMI International) 
acquired a Mexican debt interest, which it transferred to Industries 
(CMI-Texas’ Mexican subsidiary).74 The court articulated that while 
“section 351(a) allows the tax-free exchange of property from a 
shareholder to its wholly owned subsidiary, section 367(a) may deny 
such treatment if the transfer is from a domestic to a foreign 
corporation.”75 The court stated that the transfer described above fell 
within the scope of section 367(a).76 Assuming arguendo that CMI-
Texas realized gain on the transaction, the court held that the amount 
of recognized gain was limited to zero under temporary income tax 
                                                 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 983 (citing United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65, 72 (1962)). 
70 G.M. Trading Corp., 121 F.3d at 983. 
71 Id. 
72 CMI Int’l, Inc. v. Comm’r, 113 T.C. 1 (T.C. 1999). 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 4-5. 
75 Id. at 5. 
76 Id. 
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regulations pursuant to section 1.367(a), because the debt interest was 
not appreciated property.77 
CMI is inapplicable to Kohler Co. v. United States,78 which is 
discussed fully in Section II., because Kohler had not transferred its 
interest in the debt obligations to its subsidiary as CMI had done.79 
 
II. KOHLER CO. V. UNITED STATES 
 
A. Description of the Kohler Transaction 
 
Kohler, the Wisconsin manufacturer of plumbing products, 
decided to build a plant, to be owned and operated by its Mexican 
subsidiary, Sanimex, in Monterrey, Mexico.80 Kohler’s motivation for 
locating its plant outside the United States was two-fold: 1) 
significantly lower labor costs, and 2) an increase in its production 
capacity for lower cost plumbing products in a location close to the 
United States, the intended market for its products.81 
Kohler became aware of the Mexican debt equity swap program, 
which Kohler recognized as an opportunity to realize even greater 
savings on its planned investment in Mexico.82 In May 1987, Kohler 
applied to the Mexican government for approval to participate in 
                                                 
77 Id. 
78 Kohler Co. v. United States (“Kohler IV”), 468 F.3d 1032 (7th Cir. 2006), 
reh’g denied and reh’g en banc denied, No. 05-4472, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 3929 
(7th Cir. Feb. 12, 2007). 
79 Kohler Co. v. United States (“Kohler I”), 247 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1096 (E.D. 
Wis. 2003). The court in Kohler I did not believe that CMI was applicable to the 
Kohler transaction. Id. The lawyers that argued Kohler, Miller & Chevalier, thought 
that the Kohler and CMI transactions were similar. Miller & Chevalier, Chartered 
Tax Controversy Alert, http://www.millerchevalier.com/files/Publication/f13a97d0-
7906-461d-8978-7b966825e8ba/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/4d5cadea-4fc9-
4993-a44f-92acadb7d1ce/2005-09-
28%20MC%20Tax%20Controversy%20Alert.pdf (last visited April 29, 2007). 
80 Kohler I, 247 F. Supp. 2d at 1084. 
81 Id. at 1084-85. 
82 Id. at 1085. 
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Mexico’s debt equity swap program.83 Kohler’s application was 
approved in September 1987.84 
Kohler purchased from Bankers Trust Company an interest in 
publicly traded debt obligations owed by the Mexican government.85 
The face value of the debt interest Kohler acquired was $22,439,000, 
but Kohler paid only $11,114,267 for the debt.86 The transaction 
between Kohler and Bankers Trust was negotiated at arms-length, with 
the price paid for the debt obligations being the fair market value of 
the debt at the time of the transaction. 87 Put another way, the amount 
Bankers Trust received for the debt was the best price at which the 
debt obligations could be sold.88 
The debt equity swap transaction was finalized on December 28, 
1987.89 Under the terms of the party’s agreement, four prearranged and 
interrelated steps occurred.90 
                                                 






89 Id. at 1087. 
90 Id. 
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First, Bankers Trust transferred91 its interest in the Mexican debt 
obligations to Kohler for $11,114,267.92 Second, Bankers Trust 
delivered the original debt obligations to a ministry of the Mexican 
government for cancellation.93 Third, the Mexican Central Bank 
established a bank account, into which it deposited 43,778,766,018 
Mexican pesos, for Sanimex, Kohler’s Mexican subsidiary.94 The 
                                                 
91 The acquisition of the debt obligations occurred in stages prior to as well as 
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pesos were nominally equivalent to $19,500,564 or 87% of the face 
value of the original debt obligations.95 Finally, Sanimex issued 
qualified capital stock, in the name of Kohler, for 43,778,766,018 
Mexican pesos.96 
 
B. Procedural Background 
 
Kohler treated the purchase of the debt and its sale to the Mexican 
government as yielding no taxable income.97 Essentially, it was as if 
the Mexican government had paid Kohler $11.1 million in dollars 
rather than paying it in pesos.98 The IRS disagreed with this treatment 
of the transaction and added $8.4 million to Kohler’s taxable income, 
the difference between the price that Kohler had paid Bankers Trust 
for the Mexican debt and $19.5 million.99 
Kohler then filed with the IRS an amended tax return in which it 
claimed a refund of income taxes for 1987 in the amount of 
$3,350,383 (the amount of the additional tax assessed against Kohler 
as a result of the IRS’s adjustment to Kohler’s income).100 The IRS 
disallowed the refund claim and Kohler filed suit for a refund.101 
Kohler then filed a motion for summary judgment, which was 
denied by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Wisconsin on February 20, 2003.102 Next, Kohler petitioned the court 
to certify an interlocutory appeal to the Seventh Circuit, which was 
                                                 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
97 Kohler Co. v. United States (“Kohler IV”), 468 F.3d 1032, 1033 (7th Cir. 
2006), reh’g denied and reh’g en banc denied, No. 05-4472, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 
3929 (7th Cir. Feb. 12, 2007). 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
100 Kohler Co. v. United States (“Kohler I”), 247 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1088 (E.D. 
Wis. 2003). 
101 Id. 
102 Id. at 1083-84.  
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granted.103 Then, Kohler moved again for summary judgment, which 
was granted on September 1, 2005.104 Finally, the case went to the 
Seventh Circuit.105 
 
C. Seventh Circuit Decision  
 
The first part of the court’s decision consisted of a history of 
Mexico’s debt-equity swap program and a description of the 
transaction involving Kohler.106 
Basically, under the terms of the debt-equity swap program, the 
Mexican government swapped the $11.1 million debt Kohler had 
bought from Bankers Trust for $19.5 million worth of pesos, as 
calculated at the then current market exchange rate of 2245 pesos to 
the dollar.107 The Seventh Circuit thought that the qualification in “as 
calculated at the then current market exchange rate” was critical.108 
If that was not the right exchange rate to use for the transaction, 
then the pesos that Kohler received may not have really been worth 
$19.5 million.109 The court reasoned that the pesos were worth less 
because 1) Mexico was willing to offer $19.5 million in pesos for debt 
that Kohler had purchased for only $11.1 million, and 2) Mexico had 
to compensate Kohler for accepting pesos that came with restrictions 
that reduced their value (the pesos had to be spent in Mexico on 
projects approved by the government and could not be freely 
converted to dollars or other foreign currencies until 1998).110 As a 
                                                 
103 Kohler Co. v. United States (“Kohler II”), No. 01-C-753, 2003 WL 
21693705 (E.D. Wis. June 4, 2003). 
104 Kohler Co. v. United States (“Kohler III”), 387 F. Supp. 2d 921, 922 (E.D. 
Wis. 2005). 
105 Kohler Co. v. United States (“Kohler IV”), 468 F.3d 1032 (7th Cir. 2006), 
reh’g denied and reh’g en banc denied, No. 05-4472, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 3929 
(7th Cir. Feb. 12, 2007). 
106 Id. at 1032-33. 
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result, Kohler received an exchange rate of 3939 pesos to the dollar, 
rather than 2245 pesos to the dollar, which is what the court said 
turned $11.1 million of dollar debt into $19.5 million in pesos.111 
The second part of the Seventh Circuit’s decision outlined three 
different ways of accounting for Kohler’s purchase of Mexican 
debt.112 
First, the court proffered its preferred approach, which was “to 
add $11.1 million to the basis of Kohler’s investment in the Mexican 
plant.”113 The court reasoned that this would prevent Kohler from 
receiving a “windfall.”114 
Second, the court acknowledged an alternative way of accounting 
for the swap would have been to accept Kohler’s argument. 115 Kohler 
had argued that the value of the debt that it purchased was 
unascertainable at the time of purchase. 116 Thus, the exchange of the 
debt for the peso account should be treated as a swap yielding no 
taxable income. 117 However, treating the swap in that manner would 
                                                 
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. It is somewhat unclear whether the court wants to increase Kohler’s 
basis by $11.1 million or decrease Kohler’s basis by $8.4 million. The relevant 
section of the opinion reads, “One might have thought that the way to account for 
Kohler’s purchase of Mexican debt would have been to add $11.1 million to the 
basis of Kohler’s investment in the Mexican plant, so that if it ever sold the plant the 
difference between on the one hand the sale price and on the other hand the sum of 
$11.1 million and all the other costs of the plant would be taxable income 
attributable to the sale. Then if the Mexican government's purchase of $ 11.1 million 
in debt from Kohler for $ 19.5 million in pesos was a windfall for Kohler, reducing 
the real cost of the plant, Kohler would realize a greater profit from the eventual sale 
of the plant than it would have realized otherwise, and that profit would be taxable. 
Even if the plant was never sold, the windfall would give Kohler higher profits 
(presumably taxable) on sales of the plant's output because the deductions from 
taxable income that it could take for depreciation of the cost of the plant would be 
lessened by the $ 8.4 million reduction in its basis.” Id. at 1033-34 (emphasis 
added). 
114 Id. at 1033. 
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not mean that the results of Kohler’s transaction would never be 
taxable, as any capital gains that resulted in the future from Kohler’s 
use of the pesos to purchase goods and services for its projects would 
be taxable.118 
Third, another alternative method to evaluate the transaction, 
would be to deem the difference between the two amounts (the face 
value of the pesos and the amount paid for the debt) a contribution to 
capital to Kohler by the Mexican government.119 A contribution to 
capital would not be included in Kohler’s gross income,120 but would 
be recorded on Kohler’s books as having a zero basis,121 and so could 
not be depreciated.122 The Seventh Circuit noted that this approach 
was adopted by the Fifth Circuit in G.M. Trading Corp. v. 
Commissioner, but that it felt “dubious” about it.123 
The court reasoned that compensation for a “specific, quantifiable 
service” could not be classified as a contribution to capital and that the 
Mexican government, to the extent it “overpaid” Kohler for the debt, 
was buying a service from Kohler, which was the retirement of a 
portion of Mexico’s foreign debt.124 The Fifth Circuit thought the 
purpose of the Mexican debt-equity swap program was to encourage 
foreign investment in Mexico.125 However, the Seventh Circuit said 
that was a purpose, albeit a secondary purpose, to Mexico’s desire to 
retire its foreign debt.126 
After outlining these three approaches, the Seventh Circuit stated 
that the parties had taken none of these approaches.127 Kohler and the 
IRS had both treated the sale of the Mexican debt for the pesos as a 
                                                 
118 Id. 
119 Id. 
120 26 U.S.C. § 118(a) (2000). 
121 26 U.S.C. § 362(c). 
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taxable sale under 26 U.S.C. § 1001(c).128 The dispute concerned only 
the value to Kohler of the exchange when made.129 Kohler argued that 
it had no gain from the sale.130 The IRS argued that the entire 
difference between the $19.5 million in pesos that the Mexican 
government gave Kohler and the $11.1 million that Kohler had paid to 
buy the debt that it swapped for the pesos was taxable.131 
The court disagreed with both sides.132 In the court’s opinion, 
Kohler must have had some gain because “$11.1 million in Mexican 
foreign debt was worth more to it than to Bankers Trust. It wanted 
pesos; Bankers Trust did not.”133 However, the pesos were not worth 
the full $19.5 million at which the Mexican government valued them 
for purposes of the exchange, because the pesos were not convertible 
into dollars or any other currency.134 
In the last section of its decision, the court tasked itself with 
choosing between the two adversaries’ valuations, both of which, the 
court believed were “manifestly erroneous.”135 The court noted that 
Kohler had argued that it needed no evidence, citing to United States v. 
Davis,136 which the court characterized as being “superficially similar” 
to the Kohler transaction.137 The Seventh Circuit stated that the 
Supreme Court “merely assumed,” but did not hold that the wife’s 
martial rights could not be ascertained with sufficient precision to 
enable a calculation of the husband’s gain or loss.138 The court 
distinguished Davis by stating, “The problem in our case is different. 
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It is what to do when the value of the property exchanged may well be 
ascertainable but has not been ascertained.”139 
Nevertheless, the court found that the government’s assessment of 
the value of the pesos was “undeniably excessive” because it took no 
account of the restrictions that the Mexican government had placed on 
the pesos.140 However, the court found “Kohler’s efforts [at valuation] 
. . . equally pathetic.”141 
In the court’s words, “The same thing can be worth more to one 
person (Kohler) than to another (Bankers Trust); that is the basis of 
market transactions. To a holder of Mexican debt that had no use for 
pesos, the debt was worth only half its face amount; to someone like 
Kohler who needed a great many pesos, the debt was worth more.”142 
The court emphasized that, “the Service could have justified a 
more modest estimate yet one well above $ 11.1 million, but clinging 
stubbornly to its untenable valuation it suggested no alternative to 
$19.5 million.”143 Finally, the court concluded that since the 





This section will first discuss three problems with the Seventh 
Circuit’s decision in Kohler: 1) the Seventh Circuit misunderstood the 
difference between gain and taxable gain, 2) the court needlessly 
found Davis distinguishable, and 3) that courts basis-increase (or 
decrease) approach was baseless. Then, this section will comment on 
the Seventh Circuit’s correct decision to reject 26 U.S.C. § 118 as a 
                                                 
139 Id. at 1036. 
140 Id. 
141 Id. at 1037. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. The usual rule is that the party with the burden of proof (Kohler) would 
lose. Id. at 1035. 
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way to account for the transaction. Finally, this section will conclude 
that the Davis rule should have applied to the Kohler transaction. 
 
A. The Seventh Circuit Misperceived the Difference 
 Between Gain and Taxable Gain. 
 
The overriding problem with the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in 
Kohler is the court’s confusion between gain (i.e. “I entered into this 
transaction because I am better off after the transaction is complete”) 
and taxable gain. As discussed previously, taxable gain is equal to the 
amount realized minus basis.145 
Kohler had argued that it had no gain from the sale of its debt to 
Mexico.146 The court’s reaction was that Kohler’s position was 
“untenable.”147 To the court, $11.1 million in Mexican foreign debt 
was worth more to Kohler than to Bankers Trust because Kohler 
wanted pesos, while Bankers Trust did not want pesos.148 Kohler had 
argued, in the court’s opinion, “absurdly,” that if Kohler had gained 
from the purchase, the bank must have lost, which Kohler contended 
the bank would not have done.149 The court’s position was that, “most 
transactions produce a gain to both parties—that is what induces the 
transaction.”150 In this sentence, the court is illustrating gain, but not 
taxable gain. 
For example, assume that Kate has a digital camera and Matt has 
a projector, both of which have a fair market value of $100 and a basis 
of $10. Let’s say that Kate trades her digital camera for Matt’s 
projector, because Kate really wants a digital camera and Matt really 
wants a projector. Perhaps Kate likes Matt’s projector so much that she 
would be willing to pay him $125 for the projector. Even though 
Kate’s new projector was worth $125 to her, Kate’s taxable gain from 
                                                 
145 26 U.S.C. § 1001 (2000). Taxable gain = amount realized – basis.  
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the exchange is only $90, because the fair market value of the 
projector was only $100.151 For non-cash sales, what is taxed by the 
government is the difference between the fair market value of the 
property and the taxpayer’s basis in the property.152 Nowhere in the 
Internal Revenue Code does it state that a taxpayer’s personal value in 
the property, for example, the fact that Kate really wanted a projector 
or pesos, come into play. 
Or, suppose I buy a bottle of soda from a vending machine. I’m 
really thirsty, so I would be willing to pay $3.00 for a drink. Luckily, 
the vending machine only needs $1.25 in order to release a bottle. The 
government does not tax me on my $1.75 “gain.”153 
This first misstep leads the court down the wrong path—looking 
for a way to measure non-existent “gain” it finds to be inherent in the 
Kohler transaction.154 Since the court has concluded there must be 
“gain,” the court needs to find a way to distinguish the Kohler 
transaction from Davis. If the Davis rule had been applied to the 
Kohler transaction, Kohler’s swap would have been a “wash,” given 
                                                 
151 $90 gain = $100 amount realized - $10 basis. 
152 26 U.S.C. § 1001 (2000).  
153 A similar idea to the concept described above is known as “imputed 
income.” Imputed income, which is not taxed, is a form of non-cash income that 
stems from the enjoyment of property, or from goods used by the taxpayer, or from 
services performed for or by the taxpayer. John K. McNulty & Daniel J. Lathrope, 
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS, 46 (Thomson West 2004) (1972). For 
example, the benefit a student receives in excess of the cost of tuition paid, would be 
imputed income. Id. While nothing in the Internal Revenue Code excludes imputed 
income from taxation, an “unstated exclusion” generally shelters such income from 
tax, partly because of the administrative and compliance problems involved with 
attempting to tax imputed income. Id. For example, 26 U.S.C. § 132 taxes some 
employee fringe benefits, which can be considered a form of imputed income. Id. 
154 But c.f. Christopher Gottscho, Note, Debt-Equity Swap Financing of Third 
World Investments—Will the I.R.S. Hinder U.S. Swappers?, 8 VA. TAX REV. 143, 
169 (1988) (“The popularity of debt-equity swap financing of [less developed 
countries] investments among investors indicates there may be some merit to this 
perception of gain.”] 
22
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that the debt interest and the restricted pesos would be deemed to have 
equal values. 155 
 
B. The Court Needlessly Finds Davis Distinguishable. 
 
The second flaw in the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning occurs when 
the court concludes that United States v. Davis is not applicable to the 
Kohler transaction.156 Recall that Davis held that absent a readily 
ascertainable value, the value of two properties exchanged in an arms-
length transaction are either equal or presumed to be equal in value.157 
The court misconstrues the Supreme Court’s holding in Davis by 
claiming, “[t]he problem in our case is different. It is what to do when 
the value of the property exchanged may well be ascertainable158 but 
has not been ascertained.”159 
This of course is not what Davis said.160 The Court stated that, 
“Absent a readily ascertainable value it is accepted practice where 
property is exchanged to hold, as did the Court of Claims in 
Philadelphia Park Amusement Co. v. United States that the values ‘of 
the two properties exchanged in an arms-length transaction are either 
equal in fact, or are presumed to be equal.’”161 The key phrase in 
Davis was “readily ascertainable.” “Readily” means “without much 
difficultly: easily.”162 It follows that if the value of the debt interest is 
easily ascertainable whereas the value of the restricted pesos is not 
                                                 
155 United States v. Davis , 370 U.S. 65, 72 (1962). 
156 Kohler Co. v. United States (“Kohler IV”), 468 F.3d 1032, 1036 (7th Cir. 
2006), reh’g denied and reh’g en banc denied, No. 05-4472, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 
3929 (7th Cir. Feb. 12, 2007). 
157 Davis, 370 U.S. at 72. 
158 For examples of different ways to value restricted currency, see Leslie A. 
Sowle, Comment, International Debt for Equity Swaps: Does Revenue Ruling 87-
124 Make Sense?, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 1079 (1989). 
159 Kohler IV, 468 F.3d at 1036. 
160 Davis, 370 U.S. at 72. 
161 Id. (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
162 WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (Frederick C. Mish, ed. 
1987). 
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easily ascertainable, the court should have followed the Davis rule and 
concluded that the value of the debt interest and restricted pesos were 
equal. 
Other commentators have noted that the use of the Davis rule 
should be acceptable in debt equity swaps.163 This is because the fair 
market value of debt-equity currency, in this case, the restricted pesos, 
is affected by the limitations on the use of the currency.164 In contrast, 
the fair market value of the debt obligation may be more readily and 
reliably ascertained165 because there is a market for the debt 
obligations.166 Providing further proof of the sensibility of the Davis 
rule (i.e. the value of the restricted pesos was equal to the value of the 
debt obligation) is the fact that, “[e]ven if, despite the investment 
restrictions, a buyer could be found who met the [swap country’s] 
restrictions, the buyer probably would not pay more for the investment 
than the U.S. parent paid, assuming the buyer also could utilize debt-
equity swaps.”167 
The discussion of why United States v. Davis168 is the preferred 
analysis will resume in Subsection E. 
 
C. Adding Basis is Baseless. 
 
The Seventh Circuit suggests in dicta that the proper way to 
account for Kohler’s debt purchase would be to add $11.1 million to 
                                                 
163 Leslie A. Sowle, Comment, International Debt for Equity Swaps: Does 
Revenue Ruling 87-124 Make Sense?, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 1079, 1110 (1989). 
164 Id. 
165 Id. 
166 Kohler Co. v. United States (“Kohler I”), 247 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1086 (E.D. 
Wis. 2003); see Christopher Gottscho, Note, Debt-Equity Swap Financing of Third 
World Investments—Will the I.R.S. Hinder U.S. Swappers?, 8 VA. TAX REV. 143, 
147-49 (1988). 
167 Christopher Gottscho, Note, Debt-Equity Swap Financing of Third World 
Investments—Will the I.R.S. Hinder U.S. Swappers?, 8 VA. TAX REV. 143, 172 
(1988). 
168 370 U.S. 65 (1962). 
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the basis of Kohler’s investment in the Mexican plant.169 It is 
somewhat unclear whether the court desires to add $11.1 million to 
Kohler’s basis170 or subtract $8.4 million from Kohler’s basis.171 The 
court reasoned that this basis-increase (or basis-decrease) approach 
would prevent Kohler from receiving a “windfall.”172 
Here, adding $11.1 million to its basis would be a gift to Kohler. 
Taxpayers love basis because it lowers their potential taxable gain. 
For example, if Kohler sold the factory for $50 million and its 
basis was $29 million173 adding $11.1 million to Kohler’s basis would 
result in basis being $40.1. Upon the sale, the taxable gain would then 
be $50 million minus $40.1 million, or $9.9 million. Without adding 
the “extra” $11.1 million to the basis, Kohler’s taxable gain would 
have been $21 million, $50 million minus $29 million. Obviously, 
giving Kohler additional basis is not a good solution if the court wants 
to ensure Kohler is not receiving a tax-free windfall.174 
On the other hand, the court’s basis-decrease (or “wait-and-
see”175) approach is more sensible. If this is the case, it seems that the 
court is alluding to treating the Kohler transaction as an “open 
                                                 
169 Kohler Co. v. United States (“Kohler IV”), 468 F.3d 1032, 1033 (7th Cir. 
2006), reh’g denied and reh’g en banc denied, No. 05-4472, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 
3929 (7th Cir. Feb. 12, 2007). 
170 Id. at 1033-34 (“One might have thought that the way to account for 
Kohler’s purchase of Mexican debt would have been to add $11.1 million to the 
basis of Kohler’s investment in the Mexican plant, so that if it ever sold the plant the 
difference between on the one hand the sale price and on the other hand the sum of 
$11.1 million and all the other costs of the plant would be taxable income 
attributable to the sale”) (emphasis added). 
171 Id. (“Even if the plant was never sold, the windfall would give Kohler 
higher profits (presumably taxable) on sales of the plant's output because the 
deductions from taxable income that it could take for depreciation of the cost of the 
plant would be lessened by the $ 8.4 million reduction in its basis”) (emphasis 
added). 
172 Id. at 1033. 
173 Id. at 1032 (Kohler estimated the plant in Mexico would cost at least $29 
million to build). 
174 Id. at 1033. 
175 Id. at 1035. 
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transaction.” An “open transaction” is when the sale or exchange or 
property does not result in reported income at the time of the sale or 
exchange.176 If the transaction is treated as “open,” Kohler would not 
be deemed to have received taxable income until Kohler’s basis (the 
$11.1 million it had paid for the debt obligation) had been 
recovered.177 However, receipt of property, in this case the pesos, is 
usually “treated as a final sale and a value is somehow placed upon 
it.”178 
In any case, the court’s suggestion does not matter because the 
swap is considered a taxable sale; 179 and the court’s approach does not 
appear to be allowed by either statue or precedent. Moreover, the open 
transaction issue may not arise as the IRS, in Revenue Ruling 87-124, 
which the IRS promulgated to govern foreign debt-equity swaps, 
views the gain “as occurring at the conversion stage of the 
transaction.”180 
 
D. Correct to Reject Section 118 
 
The Seventh Circuit was correct in rejecting the Fifth Circuit’s 
endorsement of 26 U.S.C. § 118 as a way of handling the debt-equity 
swap tax problem. Section 118(a) of the Internal Revenue Code states, 
“In the case of a corporation, gross income does not include any 
contribution to the capital of the taxpayer.”181 This exclusion “applies 
to the value of land or other property contributed to a corporation by a 
governmental unit or by a civic group for the purpose of inducing the 
                                                 
176 John K. McNulty & Daniel J. Lathrope, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF 
INDIVIDUALS, 348 (Thomson West 2004) (1972). 
177 Id. at 349. 
178 Id. 
179 Kohler IV, 468 F.3d at 1035. 
180 Christopher Gottscho, Note, Debt-Equity Swap Financing of Third World 
Investments—Will the I.R.S. Hinder U.S. Swappers?, 8 VA. TAX REV. 143, 178-79 
(1988). 
181 26 U.S.C. § 118(a) (2000); G.M. Trading Corp. v. Comm’r, 121 F.3d 977, 
980 (5th Cir. 1997). 
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corporation to locate its business in a particular community.”182 
Contributions to capital can also be made by foreign governments for 
purposes of inducing business location or expansion.183 
The primary test for whether a transaction will be considered a 
section 118 contribution to capital is the intent of the person who made 
the payment.184 Here, it is clear the Mexican government’s motivation 
was two-fold, to encourage economic development, but mainly to 
retire its foreign debt.185 The law is that compensation for a “specific, 
quantifiable service” cannot be a contribution to capital.186 Here, 
Mexico was buying a service from Kohler—the retirement of a portion 
of Mexico’s foreign debt,187 which would exclude the application of 
26 U.S.C. § 118 to the Kohler transaction.188  
 
E. The Davis Rule Should Have Applied to the Kohler Transaction. 
 
Davis should be applied exactly in situations such as the 
transaction at issue in Kohler, where the value of restricted pesos is 
not easily ascertainable, but the value of the debt interest is readily 
ascertainable. 
                                                 
182 26 C.F.R. § 1.118-1 (1996); G.M. Trading Corp., 121 F.3d at 980. 
183 26 C.F.R. § 1.118-1; Rev. Rul. 70-226. 
184 Ridgeley A. Scott, Taxation of Maquiladora Exchanges: The Taming of the 
Shrew, 5 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 201, 211 (1997). 
185 Kohler Co. v. United States (“Kohler IV”), 468 F.3d 1032, 1034 (7th Cir. 
2006), reh’g denied and reh’g en banc denied, No. 05-4472, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 
3929 (7th Cir. Feb. 12, 2007). 
186 Id. (citing United States v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co., 412 
U.S. 401, 413 (1973)). 
187 Kohler IV, 468 F.3d at 1034. 
188 26 U.S.C. § 118(a) (2000). 
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First, the Davis rule is generally accepted189 and it is a principle of 
tax law that has been reaffirmed many times.190 It is generally 
accepted because it is intuitively sensible. Unrelated parties in arms-
length transactions generally do not give the other side more money 
for their property than it is worth.191 The motivation of unrelated 
                                                 
189 United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65, 72 (1962) (“Absent a readily 
ascertainable value it is accepted practice where property is exchanged to hold, as 
did the Court of Claims in Philadelphia Park Amusement Co. v. United States, 130 
Ct. Cl. 166, 172, 126 F. Supp. 184, 189 (1954), that the values ‘of the two properties 
exchanged in an arms-length transaction are either equal in fact, or are presumed to 
be equal.’ Accord, United States v. General Shoe Corp., 282 F.2d 9 (C. A. 6th Cir. 
1960); International Freighting Corp. v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 310 (C. A. 2d Cir. 
1943)”). 
190 G.M. Trading Corp. v. Comm’r, 121 F.3d 977, 983 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing 
see, e.g., Keener v. Exxon Co., USA, 32 F.3d 127, 132 (4th Cir.1994) (“An actual 
price, agreed to by a willing buyer and a willing seller, is the most accurate gauge of 
the value the market places on a good”); Dessauer v. Comm’r, 449 F.2d 562, 566 
(8th Cir.1971); Bar L Ranch, Inc. v. Phinney, 426 F.2d 995, 1001 (5th Cir.1970); 
Pulliam v. Comm’r, 329 F.2d 97, 99 (10th Cir.1964); see also United States v. 
Garber, 607 F.2d 92, 97 (5th Cir.1979) (en banc) (assuming, without deciding, the 
applicability of Davis ); cf. United States v. Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546, 551, 93 S. Ct. 
1713, 1716 (1973) (“The willing buyer-willing seller test of fair market value is 
nearly as old as the federal income, estate, and gifts taxes themselves”); McDonald 
v. Comm’r, 764 F.2d 322, 329 (5th Cir.1985) (“We express initially a strong 
disinclination to disturb the established meaning of the term "fair market value' as it 
was enunciated by the Supreme Court in United States v. Cartwright”); but cf. 
Mitchell v. Comm’r, 590 F.2d 312, 314 (9th Cir.1979) (declining to apply the Davis 
rule to a stock option, the value of which could be easily determined when sold 
(though the value could not easily be determined when the option was granted), and 
cautioning that the Davis rule should be applied only as a last resort to prevent 
taxable exchanges without readily ascertainable values from escaping taxation 
altogether)). 
191 Leslie A. Sowle, Comment, International Debt for Equity Swaps: Does 
Revenue Ruling 87-124 Make Sense?, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 1079, 1105 (1989) (“After 
all the market price on which the negotiated cost of the obligation would be based 
presumably reflects what debt for equity swaps are worth to buyers and sellers of 
developing country debt”); Christopher Gottscho, Note, Debt-Equity Swap 
Financing of Third World Investments—Will the I.R.S. Hinder U.S. Swappers?, 8 
VA. TAX REV. 143, 174 (1988) (“Yet the best reason for applying the presumed 
equivalence-in-value [Davis] rule is hat there is no reason to believe an investor 
28
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parties is to get the best price they can; not to give their opponent 
“freebies.” 
In addition to being intuitively sensible, the Davis rule has been 
applied to an analogous fact situation.192 The Fifth Circuit, in G.M. 
Trading Corp. v. Commissioner, concluded that since G.M. had 
surrendered $600,000 of debt to the Mexican government in exchange 
for an unknown value of restricted pesos, the court had to assume that 
the value received for $600,000 of debt was, in fact, $600,000 since 
the transaction was at arms-length and the value of the restricted pesos 
was not readily ascertainable.193 The G.M. court reaffirmed Davis,194 
and noted that this principle reflects the common sense notion that an 
asset’s value is the price persons are willing to pay for it.195 
Further strengthening the appeal of the Davis rule is that Court of 
Claims, the court that originated the rule in Philadelphia Park 
Amusement Co. v. United States,196 believes that the Davis rule can be 
to some extent widely applied.197 The Court of Claims in Tasty Baking 
Co. considered the situation of a taxpayer who had contributed real 
property to his employee’s pension plan.198 The court said, “[i]t is 
clear . . . that the technique of presuming an intangible and 
unappraisable contribution as an equal exchange for property 
transferred is to be applied to a variety of situations broad enough at 
least to include a taxpayer who desires the separation of a wife, and 
one who wishes the continued adhesion of an employee.199 The court 
concluded that the quid pro quo for the contribution was the past and 
future services of the taxpayer’s employees, which was presumptively 
                                                                                                                   
would pay any more for an equity investment that it believes the investment is 
worth”). 
192 G.M. Trading Corp. v. Comm’r, 121 F.3d 977, 983 (5th Cir. 1997). 
193 Id. 
194 Id. (citing see United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65, 72 (1962)). 
195 G.M. Trading Corp., 121 F.3d at 983. 
196 126 F. Supp. 184 (Ct. Cl. 1954). 
197 Tasty Baking Co. v. United States, 184 Ct. Cl. 56, 61-62 (Ct. Cl. 1968).  
198 Id. at 59. 
199 Id. at 61-62 (emphasis added). 
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equal to the fair market value of the real property contributed to the 
pension plan.200 
Most importantly, the fact situations of the cases where the Davis 
rule has been effectively applied are more similar to the characteristics 
of debt-equity swaps than the characteristics of transactions where the 
Davis rule did not apply.201 
For example, in Bar L Ranch, Inc. v. Phinney the court held that 
the Davis rule applied in a situation where a taxpayer202 traded 51.576 
acres of land and improvements in exchange for the taxpayer’s 
indebtedness and open accounts.203 The court noted that there was no 
market established for the note and open accounts and that it would be 
difficult, even for an expert, to value the note and open accounts.204 
The Davis rule has also been applied to value gasoline distribution 
agreements,205 and stock that has no readily ascertainable market value 
because no sales of the stock had ever been made.206 
In contrast, in Dessauer v. Commissioner the court held that the 
Davis rule was inapplicable because, “[t]here is nothing inherently 
difficult in ascertaining the value of commercial paper which is 
regularly bought and sold on the market.”207 In another case, the court 
found that a taxpayer was not entitled to rely on Davis to value a stock 
option because the value of the option, although not readily 
ascertainable at the time it was granted, could be determined with 
precision at the time it was sold.208 
                                                 
200 Id. at 63. 
201 Bar L Ranch v. Phinney, 426 F.2d 955, 996 (5th Cir., 1970); Spartan 
Petroleum Co. v. United States, 437 F. Supp. 733, 736 (D. S.C. 1977); S. Natural 
Gas Co. v. United States, 188 Ct. Cl. 302, 352 (1969); but c.f. Dessauer v. Comm’r, 
449 F.2d 562, 566 (8th Cir. 1971); Mitchell v. Comm’r, 590 F.2d 312, 314 (9th Cir. 
1979). 
202 Bar L Ranch, 426 F.2d at 999 (The taxpayer was insolvent). 
203 Id. at 1001. 
204 Id. 
205 Spartan Petroleum Co., 437 F. Supp. at 733-36. 
206 S. Natural Gas Co., 188 Ct. Cl. at 352. 
207 449 F.2d at 566. 
208 Mitchell v. Comm’r, 590 F.2d 312, 314 (9th Cir. 1979). 
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Unlike commercial paper and stock options, it is difficult to 
ascertain the value of restricted pesos, such as the ones at issue in 
Kohler.209 One commentator has noted that, “[t]he main limitation on 
the practice of valuing property received according to the appraisable 
property exchanged is that its use is confined to cases where there is 
‘little or no market’ for the unappraisable property . . . [but the] 
restrictions imposed by [swap countries] on investments financed by 
debt-equity swaps assure that this limitation is inapplicable.” 210 The 
restricted pesos offered by Mexico “can only be used for approved 
investments and cannot be sold.” 211 In addition, “[t]he secondary 
market exists only for debt; there are no firm indicators of the local 
currency’s value apart from subjective discounting which is inaccurate 
due to lack of liquidity and political risk.”212 
Moreover, not following the Davis rule leads to unreasonable 
results, given the fact that the debt-equity swap valuation problem can 
be easily solved by application of the Davis rule. The only solution 
offered by the Seventh Circuit is that the court could estimate the 
value of the restricted currency itself. After the court determined that 
the value of the pesos “may well be ascertainable but has not been 
ascertained,”213 the court suggested that the IRS present evidence that 
could persuade a rational fact finder that the pesos Kohler received 
from the Mexican government were worth well above $11.1 million.214 
                                                 
209 See Kohler Co. v. United States (“Kohler IV”), 468 F.3d 1032, 1037 (7th 
Cir. 2006), reh’g denied and reh’g en banc denied, No. 05-4472, 2007 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 3929 (7th Cir. Feb. 12, 2007). 
210 Christopher Gottscho, Note, Debt-Equity Swap Financing of Third World 
Investments—Will the I.R.S. Hinder U.S. Swappers?, 8 VA. TAX REV. 143, 172-73 
(1988). “The presumed-equivalence-in-value rule of Davis has generally been 
limited to ‘cases involving valuation of property for which there is little or no 
market.’” Bar L Ranch v. Phinney, 426 F.2d 995, 1001 (5th Cir. 1970) (quoting Seas 
Shipping Co. v. Comm’r, 371 F.2d 528, 529 (2d Cir. 1967)). 
211 Christopher Gottscho, Note, Debt-Equity Swap Financing of Third World 
Investments—Will the I.R.S. Hinder U.S. Swappers?, 8 VA. TAX REV. 143, 172-73 
(1988). 
212 Id.  
213 Kohler IV, 468 F.3d at 1036-37. 
214 Id. at 1037. 
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This suggestion seems to inapposite to the court’s own dismay 
surrounding Kohler’s and the IRS’s “pathetic” attempts as valuing the 
restricted pesos.215 
Furthermore, the application of this policy would be very 
problematic for a debt-equity investor.216 This type of rule is 
“judgmental” as opposed to “mechanical.”217 Mechanical rules are 
rigid and can be predictably applied, while judgmental rules can be 
manipulated.218 In addition, judgmental rules require legal advice and 
often litigation, which makes their application expensive.219 On top of 
which, the outcome will be unpredictable, especially when there is an 
absence of judicial precedents and a lack of reliable expert 
testimony.220 These disadvantages could discourage debt-equity swaps, 
especially when investors consider that their estimate could be 
different from the court’s estimate, making them liable for taxes that 
they never expected to pay.221 
                                                 
215 Id. 
216 Leslie A. Sowle, Comment, International Debt for Equity Swaps: Does 





221 Id. at 1084 (“[t]he uncertain tax consequences of swaps may actually deter 
potential investors from embarking on these transactions”). 
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The Seventh Circuit should have applied the Davis rule in Kohler 
Co. v. United States.222 The Davis rule is generally accepted223 and it is 
a principle of tax law that has been reaffirmed many times.224 The 
Davis rule is intuitively sensible; unrelated parties in arms-length 
transactions do not give their adversary more money for their property 
than it is worth.225 Most importantly, the fact situations of the cases 
                                                 
222 Kohler Co. v. United States (“Kohler IV”), 468 F.3d 1032 (7th Cir. 2006), 
reh’g denied and reh’g en banc denied, No. 05-4472, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 3929 
(7th Cir. Feb. 12, 2007). 
223 United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65, 72 (1962) (“Absent a readily 
ascertainable value it is accepted practice where property is exchanged to hold, as 
did the Court of Claims in Philadelphia Park Amusement Co. v. United States, 130 
Ct. Cl. 166, 172, 126 F. Supp. 184, 189 (1954), that the values ‘of the two properties 
exchanged in an arms-length transaction are either equal in fact, or are presumed to 
be equal.’ Accord, United States v. General Shoe Corp., 282 F.2d 9 (C. A. 6th Cir. 
1960); International Freighting Corp. v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 310 (C. A. 2d Cir. 
1943)”). 
224 G.M. Trading Corp. v. Comm’r, 121 F.3d 977, 983 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing 
see, e.g., Keener v. Exxon Co., USA, 32 F.3d 127, 132 (4th Cir.1994) (“An actual 
price, agreed to by a willing buyer and a willing seller, is the most accurate gauge of 
the value the market places on a good”); Dessauer v. Comm’r, 449 F.2d 562, 566 
(8th Cir.1971); Bar L Ranch, Inc. v. Phinney, 426 F.2d 995, 1001 (5th Cir.1970); 
Pulliam v. Comm’r, 329 F.2d 97, 99 (10th Cir.1964); see also United States v. 
Garber, 607 F.2d 92, 97 (5th Cir.1979) (en banc) (assuming, without deciding, the 
applicability of Davis ); cf. United States v. Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546, 551, 93 S. Ct. 
1713, 1716 (1973) (“The willing buyer-willing seller test of fair market value is 
nearly as old as the federal income, estate, and gifts taxes themselves”); McDonald 
v. Comm’r, 764 F.2d 322, 329 (5th Cir.1985) (“We express initially a strong 
disinclination to disturb the established meaning of the term "fair market value' as it 
was enunciated by the Supreme Court in United States v. Cartwright”); but cf. 
Mitchell v. Comm’r, 590 F.2d 312, 314 (9th Cir.1979) (declining to apply the Davis 
rule to a stock option, the value of which could be easily determined when sold 
(though the value could not easily be determined when the option was granted), and 
cautioning that the Davis rule should be applied only as a last resort to prevent 
taxable exchanges without readily ascertainable values from escaping taxation 
altogether)). 
225 Leslie A. Sowle, Comment, International Debt for Equity Swaps: Does 
Revenue Ruling 87-124 Make Sense?, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 1079, 1105 (1989) (“After 
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where the Davis rule has been applied are more similar to the 
characteristics of debt-equity swaps than the characteristics of 
transactions where the Davis rule has not been applied.226 This is 
because “[t]he main limitation on the practice of valuing property 
received according to the appraisable property exchanged is that its 
use is confined to cases where there is ‘little or no market’ for the 
unappraisable property . . . [but the] restrictions imposed by [swap 
countries] on investments financed by debt-equity swaps assure that 
this limitation is inapplicable.” 227 
Moreover, not following the Davis rule leads to unreasonable 
results. If Davis is applied, the Kohler transaction described above 
would be treated as a “wash.”228 This means that Kohler would not 
have any taxable gain (or loss) from the exchange of $11 million debt 
for $19 million of restricted pesos.  
                                                                                                                   
all the market price on which the negotiated cost of the obligation would be based 
presumably reflects what debt for equity swaps are worth to buyers and sellers of 
developing country debt”); Christopher Gottscho, Note, Debt-Equity Swap 
Financing of Third World Investments—Will the I.R.S. Hinder U.S. Swappers?, 8 
VA. TAX REV. 143, 174 (1988) (“Yet the best reason for applying the presumed 
equivalence-in-value [Davis] rule is hat there is no reason to believe an investor 
would pay any more for an equity investment that it believes the investment is 
worth”). 
226 Bar L Ranch v. Phinney, 426 F.2d 955, 996 (5th Cir., 1970); Spartan 
Petroleum Co. v. United States, 437 F. Supp. 733, 736 (D. S.C. 1977); S. Natural 
Gas Co. v. United States, 188 Ct. Cl. 302, 352 (1969); but c.f. Dessauer v. Comm’r, 
449 F.2d 562, 566 (8th Cir. 1971); Mitchell v. Comm’r, 590 F.2d 312, 314 (9th Cir. 
1979). 
227 Christopher Gottscho, Note, Debt-Equity Swap Financing of Third World 
Investments—Will the I.R.S. Hinder U.S. Swappers?, 8 VA. TAX REV. 143, 172-73 
(1988). 
228 Leslie A. Sowle, Comment, International Debt for Equity Swaps: Does 
Revenue Ruling 87-124 Make Sense?, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 1079, 1106 (1989) (“If an 
investor may validly apply this equation [Davis rule] in determining the tax 
consequences of a debt for equity swap, the amount realized on the swap will equal 
the swap’s cost to the investor, yielding no taxable gain”). 
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On the other hand, if the Seventh Circuit’s dicta in Kohler229 is 
applied to debt-equity swaps, companies, like Kohler would not know 
the cost of their debt-equity swap transactions beforehand.230 
Companies would have to hire experts to value the restricted currency, 
and then litigate the matter if the IRS disagreed with the expert’s 
valuation. 231 This is unreasonable, especially since the debt-equity 
swap valuation problem can be easily solved by application of the 
Davis rule.232 
                                                 
229 Kohler Co. v. United States (“Kohler IV”), 468 F.3d 1032, 1037 (7th Cir. 
2006), reh’g denied and reh’g en banc denied, No. 05-4472, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 
3929 (7th Cir. Feb. 12, 2007). 
230 Leslie A. Sowle, Comment, International Debt for Equity Swaps: Does 
Revenue Ruling 87-124 Make Sense?, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 1079, 1102 (1989). 
231 Id. 
232 United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65, 72 (1962). 
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